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THE BURLINGTON DECISION: A VEHICLE TO
ENFORCE FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION
FOR THE HANDICAPPED
INTRODUCTION
Although education is not a fundamental right,' the people of the United
States believe education to be an essential prerequisite for achieving success in
modern society. This philosophy (as possessed by the American populace) was
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1954 in the landmark decision of Brown
v. Board of Education,2 where the Court stated:
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.'
Unfortunately, during the first two decades following Brown, such equali-
ty was not universally afforded to the handicapped.' Therefore, in 1975 Con-
gress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act (the EHA), which pre-
scribes that all handicapped6 students be provided a "free appropriate public
education.'
Central to that legislation is the Individualized Education Program (IEP).1
'San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. (11972).
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11d. at 493.
4S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1432[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1681. In 1975 the Bureau of Education for Handicapped Children reported
that less than half of the country's handicapped children were receiving an appropriate education. Id.
'Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
'The EHA defines "handicapped children" as "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired,
visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired
children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and
related services." Id. at § 1401(1).
'Id. at §1401(18). The EHA definition is as follows:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services which (A)
have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B)
meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary,
or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the indi-
vidualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) 120 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5)1 [of this titlel.
States may qualify for federal assistance to implement the EHA if they adhere to numerous comprehen-
sive requirements. Id. at § 1411.
Sections following describe lengthy "eligibility requirements" and "requisite features" with which state
plans must comply in order to be eligible for funding. Id. at §§ 1412 and 1413.
'Id. at § 1401(19).
The term "individualized education program" means a written statement for each handicapped child
developed in any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency ... qualified to provide,
or supervise the... specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children,
1
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The IEP is a written statement outlining the goals and objectives and specific
educational services for each handicapped child.9 Parents are a part of the edu-
cational process because the EHA requires their input at the IEP conference."0
In addition, detailed procedural safeguards protect the rights of the parties."
As parents continue to take an active role in the education of their chil-
dren, especially in the development and evaluation of the IEP, it is obvious
that educational services will sometimes be challenged. Although the school
and the parents share a common interest in the growth and development of the
child, each brings a different perspective to the IEP conference. When these
differences cannot be resolved among the parties, judicial review may be re-
quired. 2
That option for judicial intervention was exercised by parents of a handi-
capped child in Burlington v. Department of Education.3 In Burlington the
parents rejected the public school's proposed IEP and sought review by the
Massachusetts Department of Education's Bureau of Special Education Ap-
peals.' In the interim, the parents withdrew the child from the public school
and enrolled him (at their own expense) in a state-approved private
institution. 5 for special education.' 6 That change of placement was made with-
out the approval of the public school authorities 7 and is contrary to the
EHA.'8
the teacher, the parents or guardian of [the[ child, and. wherever appropriate, Ithel child, which state-
ment shall include
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of [the] child,
1B) a statement of annual goals. including short term instructional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to [thel child, and the extent to
which (the] child will be able to participate in regular educational programs.
ID) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and
IE) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at
least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
'Id.
'old.
"Id. at § 1415. Procedural safeguards include the "opportunity... to examine all relevant records [regard-
ing] the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child .... Id. at § 1415(b)(l)(A). Also,
parents must be provided with written prior notice whenever the school proposes to change the educational
status of the child. Id. at § 1415(b)(I)(C). Other provisions include the right to a hearing by the state educa-
tional agency and a right to bring a civil action. Id. at §§ 1415(b)(2) and 1415(e)(2).
'
2Note, Education of Handicapped Children: The JEP Process and the Search for an Appropriate Education,
56 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 81, 106 (1981).
1105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985).
"Id. at 1999.
15 Id.
'"The term "special education" means specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to
meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical
education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16.
"Burlington. 105 S. Ct. at 1999.
""During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current
educational placement of such child...." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).
[Vol. 19:2
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The United States Supreme Court examined two issues in Burlington: (1)
"whether ... potential relief under [the EHAJ includes reimbursement to par-
ents for private school tuition and related expenses, and 1(2)1 whether [the
EHAJ bars such reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and
place a child in a private school without the consent of local school
authorities."' 9
This note will present an overview of early case law relevant to the EHA,
discuss the facts and rationale of the Burlington decision, and analyze the im-
plications of Burlington as they relate to implementing the EHA in the future.
AN OVERVIEW OF EARLY CASE LAW
Passage of the EHA was preceded by a series of landmark cases which es-
tablished the right to education for all handicapped children. 0 In the first case,
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,2
(PARC), plaintiffs claimed that the challenged statutes were unconstitutional
because they excluded mentally retarded children from public education and
training.22 The district court ruled that due process requires a hearing before a
retarded child can be denied entrance to a public school." In short, the PARC
court held that mentally retarded children have a constitutional right to public
education."
The PARC holding was extended to all handicapped students in Mills v.
Board of Education.25 In Mills, seven handicapped children excluded from
public education in the District of Columbia brought a class action suit in the
federal district court. 6 The court held that (1) no child may be denied entrance
to public school unless provided with appropriate alternative services;27 and (2)
prior to exclusion, there must be a hearing to revew the child's progress and to
evaluate the adequacy of alternative placements. 8 While neither the PARC
nor Mills courts delineated a basic standard regarding the quality of education,
both courts emphasized that mere attendance in a public school is not suffi-
"Burlington, 105 S. Ct. at 2001-02. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) authorizes the reviewing court to "grant such re-
lief as the court determines is appropriate." See also § 1415(e)(3); supra note 18 for partial text of this provi-
sion.
"See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 1430.
"1334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified 343 F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). This was a class action suit
against the State of Pennsylvania and thirteen local school districts.
Dld. at 283.
1id. at 303. Other procedural safeguards were also required.
"Note, The Education For All Handicapped Children Act: What Is A "Free. Appropriate Public
Education?" 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1285, 1287 n.20 (1983).
11348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
Ald. at 868.
'd. at 878.
nid.
Fall, 1 9851
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cient2 9 To meet the intent of these rulings, at least a "minimal level of quality"
is required? °
Although these early cases provided the impetus to encourage states to
address the problems of the handicapped, the "lack of [adequate] financial
resources prevented the implementation" of equal educational opportunities
first heralded by Brown.31 Therefore, in an effort to extend the principles of
PARC and Mills, and to provide financial support through increased federal
funding, Congress enacted the 1975 landmark EHA.3 2 The stated purpose of
the EHA was "to assure that all handicapped children have ... [access to] a
free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education ... ser-
vices designed to meet [the] unique needs" of each handicapped child."
The intent of the legislature was to develop a vehicle through which
schools could provide an appropriate education for each handicapped child.
However, despite the obvious strengths of the EHA, the definition of ap-
propriate education has been criticized as being "vague and circular."34 The
guidelines within the statute have been referred to as "general"35 and
"cryptic." 6 Also, the standards for developing an appropriate education have
been deemed imprecise and "inexact."" Although this alleged ambiguity may
present difficulties in interpretation, it was necessary that the language be suf-
ficiently broad to allow for individual differences among children. What
might be appropriate education for one student could be inadequate education
for another.3 9 Furthermore, by using an imprecise standard, Congress insured
that educational decisions would remain the responsibility of the state and
local authorities.1
When judicial review is necessary, the courts must grapple with the gen-
'Note, supra note 24 at 1288. The PARC court suggested that this minimal level would be met if retarded
students could demonstrate "self-sufficiency" skills. PARC, 343 F.Supp. at 302. The Mills court stated that
alternative educational services must be "adequate" to meet the child's needs. 348 F.Supp. at 878.
'Note, supra note 26 at 1288.
'IS. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 1431; Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
2
"The fact that both PARC and Mills are discussed at length in the legislative Reports suggests that the
principles which they established are the principles which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the
Act." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1982) (Footnote omitted).
'20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
'Note, supra note 24, at 1289.
"Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1979).
'Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.
"Comment, The Meaning of Appropriate Education to Handicapped Children Under the EHCA: The Im-
pact of Rowley, 14 Sw. L. REV. 521, 530 (1984).
"Comment, Defining an Appropriate Education for Handicapped Children: Board of Education v. Rowley,
34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1983).
"Id.
'Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of Handicapped Children to an Appropriate Education: Procedures and
Remedies, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1981).
[Vol. 19:2
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eralities of the EHA and develop standards to clarify the definition of a "free
appropriate public education."" For example, in Springdale School District v.
Grace,' the school authorities claimed that a profoundly deaf child could best
be served educationally at a school for the deaf."3 However, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that states are obligated to provide an appropriate
education, not necessarily the best education." The court ruled that the child
should be placed in a regular public school classroom with sufficient auxiliary
services and that such a program would be appropriate under the EHA.'"
In Campbell v. Talladega County Board of Education, 0 the district court
uses a self-sufficiency standard.'7 The case involved a severely retarded eigh-
teen year old youth whose educational program failed to teach him functional
and communicative skills which would help increase his independence."1 The
court held that an educational program which fails to assist a child in attaining
self-sufficiency skills does not meet "even a minimally stringent standard of ap-
propriateness."' 9
In Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, " the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed5' a district court ruling that an appropriate educa-
tional standard was one designed to help the child "realize his learning poten-
tial."52 The appeals court held that residential placement was more appropriate
for a profoundly retarded child because the condition necessitated more profes-
sional help than the public school could provide. 3
For the first seven years after passage of the EHA, only the lower courts
were challenged by the meaning of "appropriate education." Then in 1982,
Board of Education v. Rowley"' became the first case in which the Supreme
4tNote, Defining Appropriate Education for the Handicapped: The Rowley Decision, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J.
685, 691-93 (1983).
42656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981).
11d. at 303.
"Id. at 304 (Emphasis original).
41Id. at 305. The court relied largely on the "mainstreaming requirement" of the EHA which
assure(s) that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children . . . are educated with
children who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
handicapped children from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severi-
ty of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and ser-
vices cannot be achieved satisfactorily.... Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
4518 F.Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
41d. at 54.
4 id. at 48, 54.
"1d. at 54.
"Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
"Id. at 699.
"Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F.Supp. 169, 173-74 (D.Del. 1980), affd. sub noma. Kruelle v. New Castle County
School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694-96 (3d Cir. 1981).
"1642 F.2d at 694.
-'458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Fall, 19851 RECENTr CASES
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Court was called upon to interpret the Act's statutory provisions.5 Rowley in-
volved a deaf child whose parents supported parts of the IEP recommended by
the school, but they also requested a qualified sign language interpreter.5 6 The
Court rejected the parents' request, emphasizing the finding that "[the child
was] receiving an 'adequate' education, since she performs better than the
average [student] in her class and is advancing easily from grade to grade."5
While the Court affirmed the state's responsibility to provide specialized
educational services, it rejected any obligation to meet an "additional substan-
tive standard."58
Although Rowley was the Supreme Court's first opportunity to interpret
the EHA, disagreements between parents and school authorities necessitated
further judicial interpretation. Burlington v. Department of Education"'
represents the Court's most recent analysis of the EHA.
THE BURLINGTON CASE
Shortly after Michael Panico began his public education in Burlington,
Massachusetts, he began to experience serious learning difficulties.' He was
identified as having "specific learning disabilities"'" "and was thus 'handi-
capped'62 within the [definition] of the Act .... "63 By the end of the third grade,
Michael had demonstrated little significant improvement and much discussion
followed between the parents and the school regarding Michael's future place-
ment." Eventually, the parents rejected the school's proposed IEP for the
fourth grade and requested an impartial due process hearing65 by the
Massachusetts Department of Education's Bureau of Special Education Ap-
oeals (BSEA)."
"Id. at 187.
"6d. at 184.
"Id. at 209-10.
"Id. at 189-90, 191-204. The Court looked to the legislative history to determine the intent of the drafters
Id.
9105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985).
Old. at 1998-99.
'20 U.S.C. § 1401(15). The EHA defines "children with specific learning disabilities" as
those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in im-
perfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. Such
disorders include such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction,
dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include children who have learning prob-
lems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of
emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. Id.
"2Id. § 140111). See § 1401(1): supra note 6 for text of the provision.
105 S. Ct. at 1999.
I, d.
20 U.S.( a 1415(b)2.
',)5 S. Ct. at 1999.
[Vol. 19:2
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RECENT CASES
In the interim, the parents received the results of various tests which had
been administered to Michael by specialists at a Massachusetts hospital.67
These specialists concluded that Michael's "emotional difficulties are second-
ary to a rather severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties
.... "68 The specialists recommended "a highly specialized setting for children
with learning handicaps.., such as the Carroll School,"69 a private facility hav-
ing state approval. Based on the hospital's assessment, the Panicos enrolled
their son at Carroll (at their own expense).7" This was contrary to the EHA
which stipulates that, during any judicial proceedings, "the child shall remain
in [his] ... current educational placement," unless the school and the parents
otherwise agree."
Disagreements continued between the Panicos and the public school of-
ficials, and several hearings were held in the fall of 1979.72 In January 1980,
the hearing officer ruled that the public school's proposed IEP and placement
were "inappropriate" and that "the Carroll School was the 'least restrictive'
"environment73 to meet Michael's needs.7' The hearing officer ordered the
school to pay Carroll for tuition and transportation costs for 1979-80 and to
reimburse Michael's parents for educational expenses incurred at Carroll."
The school then appealed to the district court pursuant to the EHA76 and
a parallel state statute," naming Mr. Panico and the State Department of
Education as defendants." In November 1980, the district court held for Mr.
Panico on the state law claim and set the federal claim for future trial. 79 Later,
67Id.
"'Id.
69Id.
"d.
"20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3). See §1415(e)(3), supra note 18 for text of the provision.
72105 S. Ct. at 1999.
11ld. The terms "mainstreaming provision" and "least restrictive environment" frequently refer to the same
concept.
The "mainstreaming provision" of the eligibility requirements provides "that, to the maximum extent ap-
propriate, handicapped children" are to be educated with their nonhandicapped peers. See 20 U.S.C.
§1412(5)(B). See supra note 47, for partial text of this provision.
In Ohio, the "least restrictive environment" is defined as follows:
[Tlo the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in public or private
institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular educa-
tional environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. RULES FOR THE EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN. 7 (1982).
"105 S. Ct. at 1999.
"Id.
111d. § 1415e1121. See § 1415(e)(2), supra note 19 for partial text of the provision.
7 Id.
"id.
N Id.
Fall. 1985)
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the court of appeals vacated this earlier judgment."
In 1982, on remand relating to the federal claim, the district court re-
versed the BSEA decision and ruled that the appropriate IEP was the one
previously proposed by the school." Mr. Panico contested the judgment, and
the case was transferred to another district judge, and consolidated with two
other cases in order to resolve similar issues. 2 In a decision on the consolidated
cases, the court ordered Mr. Panico to reimburse the school for payments to
Carroll during 1980-81 and 1981-82.11
Following Mr. Panico's appeal, the court of appeals remanded the case a
second time, affirming in part and reversing in part."' It ruled, among other
matters, that the parents' unilateral change of Michael's placement would not
bar reimbursement to the parents if their actions were found to be appropriate
at final judgment."
The school then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court
granted certiorari to consider only two issues:" (1) "whether the potential relief
under [the EHA] includes reimbursement to parents for private school tuition
and related expenses," and [21 whether [the EHA] bars such reimbursement to
parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private school without
the consent of local school authorities.
88
The Court examined the first issue and concluded that the EHA author-
izes reimbursement to parents for expenses incurred in private school place-
ment if the courts determine that that placement is appropriate within the
'The court of appeals held that the Act pre-empted the state statute as to the appropriate standard of review
of the administrative ruling. Id. at 1999-2000; Burlington v. Depart. of Educ., 655 F.2d 428, 429 (Ist Cir.
1981).
Meanwhile, in December 1980, the Massachusetts Commissioner of Education informed the school
authorities that he would freeze its special education assistance unless the school complied with the BSEA
order. In February 1981, the school agreed to pay Carroll for tuition and transportation costs for 1980-81,
but it refused to reimburse Mr. Panico for similar expenses incurred in 1979-80. 105 S. Ct. at 2000: 655 F.2d
at 430-431.
105 S. Ct. at 2000.
9
2Id.
uDoe v. Anrig, 561 F.Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1983).
First case: John Doe had Down's Syndrome of such severity that he was placed at a residential facility
shortly after his birth. His parents sought an IEP and reimbursement from the public school district for part
of the expenses incurred. Doe v. Anrig, 561 F.Supp. 121, 125 (D. Mass. 1983).
Second case: Junior was a handicapped second grader whose parents disagreed with the public school
about several IEPs developed for their son. The school violated various procedural safeguards by excluding
the parents from the first IEP conference and failing to give proper notice for others. Pending their appeal,
the parents transferred Junior to a private school and sought reimbursement for their expenses. Angier v.
Anrig, 561 F.Supp. 121, 125-26 (D. Mass. 1983).
"Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 802 (Ist Cir. 1984).
'Id. at 799.
1l05 S. Ct. at 2001-02.
"Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). See § 1415(e)(2), supra note 19 for partial text of the provision.
"ld.; § 1415(e)(3). See § 1415(e)(3), supra note 18 for partial text of the provision.
[Vol. 19:2
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terms of the statute. 9 However, if the courts determine that the public school's
proposed educational program is proper, the parents would be barred from
reimbursementse
The Court examined the statutory language which contemplates that
education for the handicapped will be extended to children in public or private
institutions, and that, where appropriate, handicapped children will be
educated with their nonhandicapped peers. 91 Therefore, the Court reasoned,
when judicial proceedings determine that appropriate educational services are
unavailable in a public school setting, it is "clear beyond cavil" that relief
should include private school placement at public expense.9
The Court also considered the length of time necessitated by ad-
ministrative and judicial review. 93 Although the review process can often be
lengthy, the Court noted that in this case the time delay was "ponderous."9 '
The term covered by the challenged IEP could lapse before the case ever came
to trial. The Court then balanced the decisions parents must make in relation
to this timeframe: "go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child.., or
pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement."95 If financially
able parents choose the private placement at their own expense, the Court
reasoned that they would have an "empty victory" if eventually the Court af-
firmed their judgment but refused to permit reimbursement.,' In conclusion,
the Court looked to the Congressional intent97 and determined that "the child's
right to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to participate ful-
ly in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be
less than complete" if retroactive reimbursement were not an available remedy
when the parents' choice of placement is deemed proper.9t
In regard to the second issue, the Court refused the school's contention
that the Panicos waived their right to potential reimbursement when they
violated the EHA by unilaterally changing Michael's placement during the
"9105 S. Ct. at 2002-03.
"Id. at 2005.
' Id. at 2003; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). Procedural safeguards will "assure that, to the maximum extent ap-
propriate, handicapped children, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities,
are educated with children who are not handicapped..." See § 1412(5)(B), and supra note 73 for discussion
of "mainstreaming provision" and "least restrictive environment."
92105 S. Ct. at 2003.
931d.
"ld. By 1983, for the Burlington case alone, "there were 577 pages of administrative transcript, considerable
documentary evidence, and new live expert testimony... The activities of counsel led to 198 docket entries
prior to the first appeal, with over 100 more" (by the time Burlington was consolidated with two other cases).
Doe v. Anrig, 561 F.Supp. 121, 124 n.2 (D. Mass. 1983). Yet it would be two more years before the case was
finally decided by the Supreme Court!
"1105 S. Ct. at 2003.
" Id.
971d.
"id. (Emphasis original).
Fall, 19851
9
Motsco: The Burlington Decision
Published by IdeaExcha ge@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
review process." The Court did agree that the parents acted contrary to the
statute.10 However, the Court "note[d] that the [EHA] calls for an agreement
by either the State or the local educational agency. "I" Thus, when the BSEA
ruled in January 1980 in favor of the Panicos, that "constituted agreement"
between the State and the parents, regarding Michael's change of placement.0 2
Therefore, the Panicos were only in violation of the EHA from the fall of 1979
through January 1980.103 This did not settle the question, however, because the
Panicos were seeking reimbursement for the entire time that Michael was
enrolled at Carroll. 1'
The Court's rationale for rejecting the school's claim that the Panicos
waived their right to reimbursement was based on its interpretation of the
statutory language. 105 The Court noted that there is no reference to financial
responsibility, waiver, or parents' right to reimbursement following judicial
review." 1 It reasoned that "Itihe Act was intended to give handicapped
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be inter-
preted to defeat one or the other of those objectives."'' 7
In its concluding remarks, the Court cautioned that "parents who
unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review pro-
ceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their
own financial risk."'0 8 The statutory language stipulates that the public agency
is not required to pay for educational services in a private school if free ap-
propriate public education is available."° Therefore, if the Court had deter-
mined that the IEP proposed by the public school was appropriate, then the
Panicos would have been barred from reimbursement during any period that
they were in violation of the EHA. 10
1ld. at 2003-04.
"'Id. at 2004.
"'Id. (Emphasis original). See also, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) or supra note 18 for partial text of this provision.
"02105 S. Ct. at 2004.
103 Id.
IO1d
"
105Id.
16Id.
107 Id.
"lid. at 2005.
""Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1985).
(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to
place the child in a private school or facility, the public agency is not required by this part to pay for
the child's education at the private school or facility....
(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public agency regarding the availability of a program ap-
propriate for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to the due process pro-
cedures. ...
"'105 S. Ct. at 2005.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
Handicapped children have very different needs and are dependent on the
schools to help them develop their capabilities. If their instruction does not em-
phasize special education designed to meet their individual differences, it may
well be inappropriate."' When parents of a handicapped child perceive that the
child's education is lacking, the parents may invoke the procedural safeguards
of the EHA."2 "Despite its [inherent] shortcomings, the parental complaint
system [therein] is the primary mechanism for enforcing substantive rights
under the Act.""' Indeed, parents today are accepting an increasingly active
role in the formal education of their children,"" and they are challenging their
local schools more frequently. Thus, for many parents, Burlington could have
a significant impact on the future of their children because it may provide the
impetus to remove the children from the current educational placement while
the judicial process continues.
Demonstrating a stance of unity, the unanimous Burlington Court clearly
resolved the issues consistently with the purpose of the EHA,"5 to hold other-
wise would deny Michael Panico "a free appropriate' public education"' 6
which is within his rights. While the holding does not clarify the meaning of
"appropriate education," it does offer greater specificity in interpreting the
statutory language. Issues of "reimbursement" and "appropriate relief' have
been addressed; Burlington now offers necessary guidance as the EHA con-
tinues to be applied.
In short, the Court has developed some guidelines for parents who seek
reimbursement under the EHA: (1) potential relief under the statute includes
reimbursement to parents for private school tuition and related expenses;"7 (2)
the statute authorizes reimbursement for expanses incurred when parents
change the child's educational placement during judicial proceedings without
the consent of school authorities.' However, the EHA only authorizes reim-
bursement for expenses incurred in private school placement if the courts
determine that that placement (rather than a public school setting) is ap-
propriate under the statute." 9
"'Haggerty and Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education.
50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 994 (1977).
220 U.S.C. § 1415. See § 1415, supra note I I for partial text of this provision.
"'Note, supra note 35, at 1113.
... Ithe responsibility for education of the young lies, first and foremost, with parents and then with the
state and local education agencies whose primary role is helping parents with that task." Bell, FallSurvey of
Education, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981 § 6 at 65 (quoting President Reagan).
"520 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
"1d. at § 1401(18).
, 105 S. Ct. at 2002-03.
"lid. at 2004.
"'d. at 2005.
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Fortunately, the Court did not intrude on matters of curriculum and
specific educational services which remain the responsibility of the state and
local agencies. Handicapped children have very different needs, and schools
must retain their flexibility and discretion to develop appropriate educational
services based on the unique characteristics of each child.
Because Burlington involved specific rights of parents, it will be used by
advocates of the handicapped to increase parental awareness of procedural
safeguards under the EHA.2 0 That, of course, would be a positive result
because such efforts would help to insure that parents are cognizant of their
statutory rights. However, if Burlington "encourages" parents (especially those
who are more affluent) to feel somewhat "casual" about unilaterally changing
their child's placement during judicial proceedings, the case could have a
negative effect. A negative result may occur because handicapped children fre-
quently learn better in an environment that is structured and predictable. Such
an environment fosters security and confidence - psychological factors which
enhance the learning process. However, if the educational setting is abruptly
shifted, the handicapped child may have difficulty adjusting to the new situa-
tion, and the child's school work may suffer accordingly.
Overt disagreements between the parents and the school may leave a
young child upset and confused if he feels "torn" between the "significant
others" in his life. Removing the child from one educational setting and enroll-
ing him in a new program (perhaps more than once) may have a positive in-
fluence on his education. However, at least initially, the handicapped child
may have difficulty adjusting to the new environment and the change in struc-
ture and routine. Thus, the new setting may be to his detriment. Obviously,
these are factors which must be balanced by the parents when they consider a
change of placement.
In an effort to narrow the issues in Burlington, the Supreme Court did not
address the question of funding. However, school authorities will be concerned
about financial matters because they are the ones who must implement the
EHA. On one hand, parents of handicapped children will understandably want
the school to provide the best education possible for their child. Nevertheless,
the cost of those special services can be burdensome to the local educational
agency. As school districts across the nation face significant financial cutbacks
and criticism that they are neglecting the basics, some scholars suggest that ex-
pensive programs for the handicapped (for many of whom remediation may
not be possible) cannot be justified."' Budget conscious educators may suggest
to parents that whatever the services proposed in the IEP, they be provided
within a public school setting, where the costs are predictably less.
1-20 U.S.C. § 1415.
'Comment, After Rowley: The Handicapped Child's Right to an Appropriate Education, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 321, 353 (1984).
[Vol. 19:2
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss2/7
It is true that the statutory language reflects a free appropriate education
and that financial resources are available. However, federal funds do not cover
the entire cost of educating the handicapped.' While Burlington did not in-
tend to resolve budgetary matters, the decision may face negative reaction
from schools which are facing financial crisis because the Court favored the
more expensive placement. Although the child's needs may demand a more
costly alternative, budget conscious educators may try to structure IEPs to fit
within already constricted budgets.' Uninformed parents may rely on the
judgment of school personnel rather than question their child's placement. Un-
fortunately, those who stand to lose are the handicapped children, many of
whom can be helped to lead positive productive lives if given direction and op-
portunity through appropriate education.
CONCLUSION
The Burlington Court resolved two issues relating to reimbursement and
appropriate relief under the EHA: (1) potential relief includes reimbursement
to parents for private school tuition and related expenses;"' (2) parents do not
waive their right to such reimbursement during judicial review if they violate
the EHA and change the child's educational placement without the consent of
school authorities. 25 However, reimbursement will only be authorized for ex-
penses incurred in a private school setting if the courts determine the place-
ment is appropriate under the statute. 6
While the "needs of ... [handicapped] children vary greatly, but the focus
[of the EHAJ is on one goal: to provide 'free appropriate public education."" 7
Burlington does not clarify the meaning of "appropriate," but it does offer
greater specificity in interpreting questions of reimbursement and appropriate
relief. The ruling may heighten parents' awareness of their rights and of the
procedural safeguards through which they may challenge the educational
system. While budgetary matters were not addressed, Burlington may provide
the impetus to influence legislators to design funding measures which will
relieve some of the financial pressures from the State and local districts. In the
interim, the intent and purpose of the EHA have become a reality for Michael
Panico and his family.
MARTHA A. MoTsco
'1Regarding costs, see 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (a). This provision outlines a mathematical formula by which the
number of handicapped children being served is multiplied by a specified percentage of the average per pupil
expenditure in public schools in the nation. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1109-11.
'See Note, supra note 35, at 1109-10.
"1105 S. Ct. at 2002-03.
'"Id. at 2004.
11Jd. at 2005.
,'"Comment, supra note 37, at 527.
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